

Can listeners modulate rapid pragmatic inferences based on knowledge about the speaker?

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Background


Disfluency...ummm...uhhhh...

- Disfluencies produced more when words are tougher to retrieve e.g. low frequency (Goldman-Eisler, 1968)
- Listeners rapidly infer reference to hard-to-name objects from disfluency (Arnold, Hudson-Kam, & Tanenhaus, 2007)
 - Canceled if speaker has object agnosia

Pragmatic inferences: Three hypotheses

- No speaker modeling; only use of conventionalized cues -ruled out by Arnold, et al. (2007), Grodner & Sedivy (in press)
 - Modeling is specific to particular speakers/situations; thus is highly flexible
 - Speaker models develop gradually, they can be suspended but not rapidly altered based on top down cues
- To tease apart 2 and 3, we introduce a speaker who is only impaired for one category of items

Design



Click on thee...umm...purple number 6.

- Fluent or disfluent instructions
- Instructions referred equally often to numbers, letters and the hard-to-name squiggles
- Speaker: typical, number-impaired, or letter-impaired


Predictions

Following a disfluency...

- Unimpaired speaker condition: look longer at the squiggle than the letter or number
- Impaired speaker condition:
 - Flexible speaker modeling*: look longer at the squiggle vs. unimpaired category, but not with the impaired category
 - Suspended speaker modeling*: no difference between the two impairment conditions

Experiment 1

- Goal: Replicate disfluency effect from Arnold et al. (2007)
- Ss told that the speaker was a "female professional" (no impairments)




Percentage of gaze time spent on correct color squiggle compared to the number or letter during the color word, unimpaired speaker, n=12

- Disfluency led to increased looks to the squiggle when pitted against numbers, $p < .01$
- No effect for Letter vs. Squiggle displays, $p > .2$
- Experiment 2 focuses on Numbers vs. Squiggles

Experiment 2

Is the effect modulated by knowledge about the speaker?

- Number- or Letter-impaired
- Looked only at Number and Squiggle displays
- Catch trials: speaker fails to remember the referent's name
 - Ss clicked on the number 90% in the number-impaired condition, and 4% for letter-impaired, $p < .01$



Percentage of gaze time spent on correct color squiggle compared to the number during the color word, number- and letter-impaired

- No disfluency effect for either impairment group, p 's $> .4$
- No significant impairment type x disfluency interaction, $p > .6$
- Significant interaction with unimpaired speaker condition (Exp. 1), $p < .05$

Summary

- Listeners can cancel pragmatic inferences when they believe the speaker is unusual
- No evidence that specific speaker characteristics are modeled during on-line processing

References

- Goldman-Eisler, F. (1968). *Psycholinguistics: Experiments in spontaneous speech*. Academic Press: London and New York.
- Grodner, D. & Sedivy, J. (In press). The effects of speaker-specific information on pragmatic inferences. In N. Pearlmuter & E. Gibson (eds). *The Processing and Acquisition of Reference*. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.
- Arnold, J., Hudson-Kam, C., & Tanenhaus, M.K., (2007). If you say thee... uh... you are describing something hard: The on-line attribution of disfluency during reference comprehension. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition*, 33, 914-930.